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INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CLOSE
CORPORATIONS FOR MISTREATMENT OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Protection of minority shareholders' in close corporations2 is a vital
concern. Although owners of a minority interest in any business enter-
prise stand in an inferior position to the majority, the minority share-
1. Professors Hetherington and Dooley explain the distinction between minority and major-
ity shareholders as follows:
[T]he terms "majority" and "minority" are used to distinguish those shareholders who
possess the actual power to control the operations of the firm from those who do not.
Although control is most often determined by the size of shareholdings, it does not de-
pend upon 51% ownership. For example, control might be exercised by a non-majority
shareholder who has special skills upon which the business depends.
Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remain-
ing Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (1977).
2. A close corporation is a "corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the securi-
ties markets." 1 F. O'N.AL, CLOSE COR'ORATIONS § 1.02, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1970). Professor O'Neal
states that the following are typical characteristics of a close corporation:
(1) the shareholders are few in number, often only two or three; (2) they usually live in
the same geographic area, know each other, and are well acquainted with each other's
business skills; (3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business, usually
serving as directors or officers or as keymen in some managerial capacity; and (4) there is
no established market for the corporate stock, the shares not being listed on a stock
exchange or actively dealt in by brokers; little or no trading takes place in the shares.
Id § 1.07, at 21 (footnotes omitted). See also Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 273,
276 (Alaska 1980); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(1975); 61 MASS. L.Q. 219, 219 (1977); Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: A Pro-
posed Model and Suggested Remedies, 47 Miss. L.J. 476, 489 n.55 (1976).
Traditionally, the same laws have governed both close and publicly held corporations. Re-
cently, however, courts and commentators have noted that the close corporation requires special
attention. See Gallerv. Galler, 32111. 2d 16, 29-31,203 N.E.2d 577, 585 (1965); Skierka v. Skierka
Bros., - Mont. _. 629 P.2d 214, 221 (1981); McCallum v. Gray, 273 Or. 617, 627, 542 P.2d
1025, 1030 (1975) (Tongue, J., concurring specially); O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legisla-
zion and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW 873, 873 (1978); Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a
Remedyfor Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1970); Comment, Relief to
Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporation. Partnership Precepts and Related Considerations, 1974
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 413-14. See generaly 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, at §§ 1.01-1.16.
Sixteen states have even adopted special legislation for close corporations. See ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10.201-218 (1977); CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (Deering Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341-356 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.107(2) (West 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§§ 1201-1216 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to -7210, 17-7212 to -7216
(1974 & Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102(5) (West 1974); MD. CoRP. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -303, 4-401 to -504, 4-601 to -603 (1975 & Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1463 (1973 & Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 5-21 (West Supp. 1979-80);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-1386 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1969); S.C.
CODE § 33-11-220 (1976); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to .30-5 (Vernon 1980). For a
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holder in a close corporation is left with few options when he is
dissatisfied with corporate management3 or is the subject of exploita-
tion4 or oppression 5 by the controlling faction.
critical analysis of close corporation legislation, see Karjala, 4 Second Look at Special Close Cor-
poration Legislation, 58 Tax. L. REv. 1207 (1981).
Most recently, the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws approved a sup-
plement to the MBCA for close corporations. ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, ProposedStatu-
tory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corpora/ion Act, 37' Bus. LAW. 269
(1981). Section 16 of the proposal deals with judicial power to dissolve corporations for minority
mistreatment, which is the subject matter of this Note. Id at 300.
3. For examples of cases in which the minority shareholder was dissatisfied with the man-
agement of the corporation, see Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 633 P.2d 599 (1981) (plain-
tiffclaimed that defendant followed illegal corporate procedures at meetings, entered transactions
without corporate purpose, and operated corporation unprofitably); Polikoff v. Dole & Clark
Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962) (defendant allegedly spent $60,000 on
rehabilitation of corporation's major asset when good possibility that mortgage on property would
be foreclosed); In re Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981) (plaintiff com-
plained that defendant controlled corporation without regarding plaintiff's interest, held no an-
nual meetings, and caused the corporation to buy defendant's own land); Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (defendants allegedly voted themselves 20 year employment
contracts and wage increases and sold corporate assets); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213
Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972) (plaintiff complained when defendant ordered expensive equip-
ment for corporation when corporation financially unstable).
4. For a discussion of exploitation by majority shareholders, see Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 1, at 5.
5. For examples of cases in which the minority shareholder claimed that he was subjected to
the oppressive acts of controlling shareholders, see Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 I11.
2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960) (plaintiff claimed that defendant, without board approval, organ-
ized another corporation with the defendant-corporation's funds, made deductions from the plain-
tiff's salary, borrowed large amounts of money for the corporation, and failed to consult with
other directors and officers on corporate policy for ten years); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ili.
App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980) (defendants allegedly conspired against plaintiff, wrongfully
accused him of theft, and barred him from the corporate business); Compton v. Paul K. Harding
Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972) (defendant allegedly failed to call board of
director meetings or consult with minority shareholders regarding management decisions and re-
sponded to minority requests with arrogance and indifference); Ross v. 311 North Central Ave.
Bldg. Corp., 130 Il. App. 2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406 (1970) (plaintiff claimed that defendant bor-
rowed corporate funds for his own corporation without plaintiff's assent or knowledge, telling
plaintiff the money was for a second mortgage that the defendant never produced); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., - Mont. _ 629 P.2d 214 (1981) (plaintiff-widow complained that defendant eval-
uated plaintiff's deceased husband's shares at less than defendant's shares, giving defendant cor-
porate control which he exercised to the exclusion of plaintif); Exadaktios v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law. Div. 1979) (plaintiff brought action when
defendant discharged plaintiff as corporate employee), aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980);
In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980)
(plaintiff claimed that defendant acted oppressively by discharging plaintiff as corporate em-
ployee, terminating his salary, removing him as officer and cosignatory at bank, and by changing
locks on corporate offices to deny plaintiff access); Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 216
S.E.2d 18 (1975) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to hold shareholder and director meetings,
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A disgruntled shareholder in a publicly held corporation can easily
withdraw his investment by selling his stock.6 This remedy is rarely
available to the close corporation minority shareholder, however, be-
cause investors are seldom willing to purchase less than a controlling
interest in a close corporation.7 In addition, because majority share-
holders already maintain control of the corporation, they have little to
gain from buying out the minority shareholder. As a result, controlling
shareholders typically make a "take it or leave it" offer to the minority
that is substantially lower than the market value of the minority
interest.
Unlike a partner in a partnership,8 a minority shareholder has no
refused to follow accepted corporate procedure, and made interest-free loans to self while corpora-
tion borrowed with interest); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315
1972) (plaintiff complained when defendant refused to pay defendant dividends, causing plaintiff
to pay taxes under subehapter S for money he was not receiving, and when defendant removed
plaintiff as officer but increased number of board members to include defendant's wife, son, and
attorney). See generally Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1; Pachman, Divorce Corporate Style:
Dissension. Oppression and Commercial Morality, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 315 (1979); Comment,
Relief to Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations Partnershp Precepts and Related Considera-
tions, supra note 2; Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Groundfor Corporate Dissolution, 1965
DUKE LJ. 128; Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: A Proposed Model and Suggested
Remedies, supra note 2.
6. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass, 578, 591, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975); Ex-
adaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law Div.
1979), aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 7;
Comment, Relief to Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnership Precepts and Related
Considerations, supra note 2, at 418; Comment, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: A Proposed
Model and Suggested Remedies, supra note 2, at 489-90. See generally F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-
OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2.15, at 42 (1975).
7. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554, 560
ILaw Div. 1979), afJ'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107
Misc. 2d 25,35,433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980). See generally Note, Minority
Dissolution of the Close Corporation. 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1068, 1077 (1967); Comment, Op-
pression of Minority Shareholders A Proposed Model and Suggested Remedies, supra note 5, at
489-90.
8. The similarity of situation, common interests and expectations, and necessity for true
cooperation among owners causes some courts and commentators to consider the close corpora-
tion more similar to a partnership than a corporation. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586-87, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
167 N.J. Super. 141, 153, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law Div. 1979), aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div.
1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 32-33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364-65 (Sup. Ct.,
Special Term 1980); Hornstein, 4 Remedyfor Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporation at the Suit o/ a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLuM. L. Rav. 220, 250 (1940); Note,
Minority Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1068, 1068 (1967); Com-
ment, Reliefto Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnershp Precepts and Related Con-
siderations, supra note 2, at 411-13; Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Groundfor Corporate
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right to dissolve the firm by the mere withdrawal of his interest.9 Ab-
sent stateI0 or judicial" intervention, corporate dissolution 12 occurs
only by written consent of all shareholders. 3 Thus, the close corpora-
tion minority shareholder can be trapped in a frustrating situation. 4
Once attempts to reconcile differences have failed, filing for involun-
tary dissolution 5 may be the minority shareholder's only defense
against mistreatment' 6 by the majority.'7 A minority shareholder may
seek to protect his investment through actual dissolution, receiving his
Dissolution, supra note 5, at 138. Cf. Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn.
65, 70, 162 N.W. 1056, 1058 (1917) (court found difference in corporations and partnerships insuf-
ficient to deny shareholders same relief afforded partners). But cf. Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 630, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973) (rejects concept that close corporation is
so much like a partnership that minority shareholders should have same right to dissolve business
as a partner). See generally Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 1-3; Comment, Exploitatlon
Among Close Corporation Shareholders: A Philosophical Change andits Consequences, 16 LAND &
WATER L. Rev. 747, 747-54 (1981).
9. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 29, 3 1(1). These sections stipulate that a partner
may dissolve the partnership by withdrawing his interest. Nearly every state has adopted the
Uniform Partnership Act. For a listing of those states and the statutory citations for their partner-
ship provisions, see R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1-2 (2d ed. Statu-
tory Supp. 1981). See also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 3; Leffler, Dispute Settlement
Within Close Corpbrations, 31 ARn. J. 254, 255 (1976). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 6.
10. See infra notes 57-72 & 134-56 and accompanying text. Section 94 of the MBCA pro-
vides in part:
A corporation may be dissolved involuntarily... by the Attorney General when
(a) The corporation has failed to file its annual report. . . or has failed to pay its
franchise tax on or before the first day of August. . .; or
ic) " The corporation has failed for thirty days after change of its registered office or
registered agent to file ... a statement of such change.
MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 94 (1980 version). Over 36 states have adopted or patterned their
corporation statutes after the Model Act. See generally R. HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 56.
11. See infra notes 26-56, 59-68, 75-133, 144-48 & 154-56 and accompanying text. See also
infra note 70.
12. There are three kinds of dissolution: voluntary dissolution, forfeiture, and involuntary
dissolution awarded by the court upon the suit of creditors or shareholders. Gusky, Dissolution,
Forfeiture, and Liquidation of Virginia Corporations, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 333, 333 (1978).
13. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 83, 84(a) (1980 version).
14. The court in Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 884, 886 (La. Ct. App.
1978) referred to the minority shareholder who lacks control in a close corporation as "trapped."
See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
Others describe close corporation minority shareholders in this situation as being "locked in."
See, eg., Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 42; Note, supra note 2, at 272.
15. Involuntary dissolution refers to mandatory dissolution by court order rather than volun-
tarily requested dissolution by a majority of corporate shareholders. See infra note 20 and accom-
panying text.
16. The general term "mistreatment" serves to encompass all majority acts that leave minor-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/6
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share of corporate assets,' 8 or he may strategically initiate a dissolution
suit to pressure the majority into either ceasing oppressive practices or
buying the minority interest at a reasonable price. 19
All states presently recognize the necessity for an involuntary disso-
lution remedy for minority shareholders of close corporations.20 As the
case law illustrates, however, that remedy may be difficult to attain.2'
The law governing such relief remains in flux, and even when courts do
grant dissolution,22 they apply various standards and reach inconsistent
ity shareholders at a disadvantage. "Mistreatment" as used in this Note is broader in scope than
the commonly used term "oppression." See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
17. Professor O'Neal stated:
If the strife among the participants has been so long and bitter that the former rela-
tionship of congeniality and trust cannot be re-established, there is little left that an
unhappy shareholder can do except sell out or bring about the dissolution of the busi-
ness; and . . . he may not be in a position to dispose of his shares without heavy
financial loss. Even if a business is still making profits, a dissatisfied shareholder may be
wise to force a dissolution and withdraw his accumulated assets from the risks of the
enterprise.
2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9. See also In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119
N.E.2d 563 (1954). Some commentators state that dissolution is an ineffective and unnecessary
remedy for the dissatisfied minority shareholder. See, e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1,
at 26-34.
18. Professors Hetherington & Dooley concluded, however, that even though a court may
order corporate dissolution, the business of the corporation usually continues because of share-
holder buy-out or sale to a third party. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note I, at 29-32, 64-75.
19. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). For a
discussion of suggested methods by which the minority shareholder can achieve the objectives of
dissolution wthout actually pursuing that remedy, see Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 27.
20. See infra notes 57-72 & 134-56 and accompanying text. In addition, states usually pro-
vide dissolution statutes outlining procedures by which a corporation can voluntarily dissolve.
For an example of such legislation, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 82-94. For an example of
an involuntary dissolution statute, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 94-103. This Note is con-
cerned only with court-ordered dissolution in suits brought by minority shareholders for the prej-
udicial acts of controlling shareholders.
21. Reluctance to dissolve corporations is evident not only in the judiciary, see infra notes 22
& 166-89, but also in state legislation. New York legislators, for example, provide that in deter-
mining whether to dissolve a close corporation, the court should consider:
(1) Whether liquidation of the corporation is the only feasible means whereby the
petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their investment; and
(2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection
of the rights and interests of any substantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § l104-a(b)(1), (2) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-82) (emphasis added).
The Texas statute pertaining to judicial dissolution of close corporations provides that corpora-
tions may be dissolved only if "all other remedies in law or in equity. . . are inadequate." TEx.
CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. art. 12.52 (Vernon 1981). See generally Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 1, at 17-18; O'Neal, supra note 2, at 882.
22. Courts frequently state that involuntary corporate dissolution is a drastic remedy and
should be considered only as a last resort. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d
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results,2' leaving plaintiffs with unclear guidelines upon which to base
a claim.
This Note discusses the equitable and statutory grounds for involun-
tary dissolution that courts and legislatures have made available to
mistreated minority shareholders of close corporations.24 Along with
this discussion, the Note describes typical judicial interpretations and
illuminates current standards for granting dissolution. The Note dem-
onstrates the kind of prejudicial acts performed against minority share-
holders of close corporations that have justified the remedy of
involuntary dissolution. An examination of the case law illustrates the
obstacles a minority shareholder may encounter in seeking the dissolu-
tion remedy. This Note attacks the validity of the sources of these ob-
270,274 (Alaska 1980); Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 11. 2d 566, 576, 141 N.E.2d 45,
50 (1957); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 300, 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (1980);
Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962); Streb v.
Abramson-Caro Clinic, 401 So. 2d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Barnett v. International Tennis
Corp., 80 Mich. App. 396, 417, 263 N.W.2d 908, 918 (1978); In re Application of Topper, 107
Misc. 2d 25, 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 278 Or. 305, 325, 564 P.2d 277, 288 (1977); Masinter v. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433, 438-39 (W.
Va. 1980). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c), comment at 38 (west Cum. Supp. 1981-82);
2 F. O'N.AL, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 26; Hornstein,
supra note 8, at 236; Note, supra note 8, at 1069; Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground/or
Corporate Dissolution, supra note 5, at 130, 135-36.
Professor O'Neal criticized judicial reluctance to order dissolution. F. O'NEAL, supra note 6,
§ 9.05. One commentator, however, commends this reluctance.
The courts may well be more perceptive than [commentators favoring dissolution,] for
their reluctance suggests their recognition that dissolution irrevocably ends a formerly
viable concern, which might have been revived if the corporation's life had continued
and the deadlock broken. In general, the judicial opinions indicate a deep disquiet and
disinclination to rely too much on dissolution as the way out.
Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 952. See also Comment, Exploitation
Among Close Corporation Shareholders. A Philosophical Change and its Consequences, supra note
8.
23. Judicial power to dissolve corporations is purely discretionary. As Professor Hornstein
explained,
[t]he existence of a statute [which confers jurisdiction upon the courts to decree dissolu-
tion] ... eliminates only the problem of whether action can be taken "in the absence of
statute." The statute does not command the court to act, and is of little aid in determin-
ing whether the corporation should be wound up. That decision rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the court, which must consider the facts in the given case and determine what
is best for all concerned.
Hornstein, supra note 8, at 244 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Comment,
supra note 7, at 495-96.
24. For a discussion of the equitable grounds for involuntary dissolution, see infra note 26
and accompanying text. For discussion of statutory grounds for involuntary dissolution, see infra
notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
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stacles and recommends legislative action to remedy the situation.25
I. INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION AS AN EQUITABLE REMEDY
The general rule at common law was that, absent statutory authority,
courts had no jurisdiction to grant dissolution at the request of a minor-
ity shareholder.26  Exceptions to the rule began to develop, in 1892
with Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. ,8 in which the Michigan Supreme
Court exercised its general power in equity to dissolve a corporation on
the basis of fraud.29 Subsequently, courts began to grant dissolution
upon showings of dissension,3" deadlock,' abuse to minority share-
holders, 2 or gross mismanagement. 33 As exceptions began to envelope
the general rule, a new rule emerged, providing courts with equity ju-
risdiction to dissolve corporations. 34 Although many courts now recog-
25. See infra notes 168-201 and accompanying text.
26. Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 633, P.2d 599 (1981); Lynch v. Buchanan, 37 Md.
App. 413, 377 A.2d 592 (1977); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). See
generaly 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.27, at 95; Comment, Deadlock andDissolution in the Close
Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered, 58 NEB. L. REv. 791, 791 (1979).
27. See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.27, at 96-97; Hornstein, supra note 8, at 232-
33; Note, Minority Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1068, 1069 (1967).
28. 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
29. The court in Miner stated:
This corporation has utterly failed of its purpose... because of fraudulent mismanage-
ment and misappropriation of its funds .... [A] court of equity, under the circum-
stances of this case, in the exercise of its general equity jurisdiction, has the power to
grant to this complainant ample relief, even to the dissolution of the trust relations.
Id at 117, 53 N.W. at 224.
30. See, eg., In re St. Clair Estate Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 964, 153 P.2d 453 (1944); Liddell v.
Smith, 43 Ili. App. 2d 57, 193 N.E.2d 45 (1963); Flemming v. Heffnler & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561,
248 N.W. 900 (1933); Edison v. Edison United Photograph Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 620, 29 A. 195 (Ch.
1894).
31. See, e.g., Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Campbell v. Pennsylvania
Indus., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 199 (D. Del. 1951); In re Hedberg-Friedheim & Co., 233 Minn. 535, 47
N.W.2d 424 (1951). For examples of recent cases in which the plaintiff sought dissolution because
of corporate deadlock, see Alkire v. Interstate Theatres Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Mass. 1974);
Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Henry George &
Sons v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512 (Wash. 1981).
32. See. ag., Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1960), af'd, 297 F.2d
185 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W.
1056 (1917); Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 858 (1955). For examples of recent
cases where minority shareholders sought dissolution, asserting abuse by majority shareholders,
see infra note 74.
33. See. e.g., Bernstein v. New Jersey Bankers See. Co., 109 N.J. Eq. 233, 156 A. 768 (1931);
Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co., 66 S.C. 100, 44 S.E. 566 (1902).
34. See generally Hornstein, supra note 8, at 220; Comment, supra note 7, at 494; Comment,
supra note 26, at 793.
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nize an inherent power to dissolve,35 others continue to cling to
tradition, refusing to exercise equity jurisdiction to grant involuntary
dissolution.36
The general inquiry for the exercise of equity jurisdiction is whether
controlling shareholders are operating the corporation in good faith to
advance its purposes and best interests.37 If the court finds that they
are, it will not grant dissolution. Courts have applied this test broadly,
dissolving few corporations on equitable grounds. Thus, although eq-
uity theoretically provides relief as justice demands, the minority share-
holder is seldom successful in acquiring a dissolution order3" solely on
this ground. 9 Even courts that recognize their equitable power to dis-
solve corporations hesitate to do so absent complementary statutory
support.4 °
35. See; e.g., Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 633 P.2d 599 (1981); In re Villa Maria,
Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540,
247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 N.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). Cf. Grant v.
Allied Developers, Inc., 44 Md. App. 560, 564-65, 409 A.2d 1123, 1125 (1980) (inherent power to
appoint a receiver to preserve a solvent coixporation).
36. See, e.g., Alkire v. Interstate Theatres Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1213-14 (D. Mass 1974);
Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 31, 184 N.E.2d 792, 792 (1962); Central
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 I11. 2d 566, 572, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1957); Ellis v. Civic Im-
provement, Inc., 24 N.C. App. 42, 209 S.E.2d 873 (1974), cer. denied, 286 N.C. 413, 211 S.E.2d
794 (1975). Cf. King v. Coulter, 113 Ariz. 245, 247, 550 P.2d 623, 625 (1976) (courts have equita-
ble jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 361
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (failure to fulfill corporate purpose is not an equitable ground; continued
existence of corporations without reasonable possibility for profit may be valid ground for equity
jurisdiction). See generally Hornstein, supra note 8, at 220-25.
37. One court stated that "[i]n determining whether to grant dissolution under either the
common law or statute, the principal inquiry appears to be whether dissolution would be benefi-
cial to the shareholders and not injurious to the public." Henry George & Sons v. Cooper-
George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 515 (Wash. 1981) (citing 2 MODEL BUSINESS CODE ANN. § 97).
38. Professors Hetherington and Dooley note that "It]he equitable power to dissolve solvent
corporations has not contributed significantly to the solution of oppression. . . in close corpora-
tions . Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 8.
39. The most common equitable grounds asserted by minority shareholders when seeking
involuntary dissolution of a corporation are fraud, gross mismanagement, oppression or abuse of
minority shareholders, shareholder or director deadlock or dissension, and impossibility of attain-
ing corporate objectives or operating at a profit. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.27, at 96.
40. Only three courts within the last 30 years have liquidated a corporation solely on equita-
ble grounds. See Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Levand v. Kowal,
350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957); Liebert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247
N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963). Within the same period, over ten times that many courts dissolved corpora-
tions on statutory grounds. See, e.g., McLeod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980); Stumpf v.
C.S. Stumpf& Sons, 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc.,
84 Ill. App. 3d 294,405 N.E.2d 839 (1980); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 111. App. 3d
488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131
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Courts are more willing to exercise their equity jurisdiction to dis-
solve a corporation, however, when there is a strong showing that cor-
porate managers have run the business solely for their own benefit.41
In Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc. ,42 for example, the defendants were
controlling shareholders of several close corporations. Plaintiffs, who
sought dissolution of two of the corporations in which they possessed a
minority interest, asserted that defendants diverted approximately
$90,000 from plaintiff's corporation to satisfy debts of defendants'
other corporations. 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia affirmed a lower court finding that the controlling shareholders had
acted for their own benefit and had seriously prejudiced the minority
shareholders' rights and interests. The court held that the cumulative
effect of the defendants' acts" warranted equitable dissolution.45
The New York Court of Appeals applies a typically narrow standard
for equitable dissolution, requiring a showing of wrongful intent by
majority shareholders.46 This intent requirement was hinted at in Lei-
bert v. Clapp, 4 7 in which the court dissolved a corporation after the
(1960); In re Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981); Skierka v. Skierka Bros.,
Mont. -., 629 P.2d 214 (1981); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359
(Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980); Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975);
White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
41. See Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056
(1917) (court granted dissolution, finding that defendant ran the corporation "solely in his own
interests" by giving himself an excessive salary and denying access to corporate records); Leibert
v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963) (court granted dissolution upon
finding that defendant looted corporate assets and perpetuated corporate existence solely for own
benefit). Cf Inre Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981) (court relied on the
state dissolution statute to dissolve the corporation but found that because the controlling share-
holder ran the corporation as he pleased, dissolution could have been granted in equity).
42. 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
43. Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants unduly depressed the market value of the plain-
tiffs' stock. Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760, 768-69 (D.D.C. 1960), aft'd, 297 F.2d
185 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
44. Some courts that decide dissolution cases on a statutory basis also examine the cumula-
tive effect of majority acts to determine whether to grant dissolution. See infra notes 93-108 and
accompanying text.
45. 297 F.2d at 187.
46. See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.27, at 97-98; Note, Corporate Dissolution in
New York: The Leibert Standard and its Application Today, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 873 (1972).
47. 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963). See generaly 2 F. O'NEAL,
supra note 2, § 9.27, at 97; Note, supra note 46; Comment, New York Broadens Availability of
Inioluntar)' Dissolution as Remedy for Intracorporate Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 697 (1964).
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majority shareholders looted corporate assets.48 The court found that
the controlling shareholders intentionally perpetuated the corporate
existence under these circumstances to coerce the minority to sell out at
a depreciated price.49
In Kruger v. Gerth,5 ° the New York Court of Appeals applied the
intent requirement that was implicitly set forth in Leiberi by mandating
a showing of bad faith for dissolution, even when minority sharehold-
ers receive no benefit from their corporate interest. In Kruger, the op-
eration of the corporation benefitted only the majority shareholder,
who was the sole corporate employee, providing him with a salary and
bonuses. The court of appeals denied dissolution, 51 relying on the trial
court's finding that the defendant did not intend to use the corporation
or its assets solely for his own benefit. 2
Similarly, in Nelkin v. HI.J Realty Corp. , the New York Court of
Appeals denied dissolution of a corporation which existed without ben-
efit to minority shareholders. Pursuant to an agreement by the incor-
porators, shareholder-tenants paid very low rents to the corporation,
leaving it essentially without profit. The two plaintiff-minority share-
holders no longer benefitted from their corporate interest after moving
from the rental property. Finding no wrongful intent by the majority
shareholders, the court stated that plaintiffs voluntarily terminated
their benefit and were not entitled to dissolution relief to escape a bad
bargain. 4
Other jurisdictions also require a showing of intent as a prerequisite
48. The court noted that a shareholder derivative action would have been inadequate:
[Tihe charges leveled against the directors. . .- that they are continuing the existence of
the corporation solely for their own benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders,
to force such shareholders to sell their holdings. . . at a sacrifice and to freeze them out
of the corporation-go far beyond charges of waste, misappropriation and illegal accu-
mulations of surplus, which might be cured by a derivative action.
13 N.Y.2d at 316, 196 N.E.2d at 542, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
49. Id at 315-16, 196 N.E.2d at 542-43, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
50. 16 N.Y.S.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965). See generally 2 F. O'NEAL,
supra note 2, § 9.27, at 98; Note, supra note 46; 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 405 (1966); 51 CORNELL L.
REv. 538, 539-40 (1966); 19 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1966).
51. 16 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803-04, 210 N.E.2d 355, 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1-2 (1965).
52. The trial court in Kruger also noted that the plaintiff's motives in seeking dissolution
were suspect because he owned a competitor of the defendant corporation. Kruger v. Gerth, 22
A.D.2d 916, 917-18, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498, 501-02 (1964), a'dmem., 16 N.Y.2d 802, 803-04, 210
N.E.2d 355, 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
53. 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969).
54. Id at 549, 255 N.E.2d at 716, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59. See generalo 2 F. O'NEAL, supra




to equitable dissolution of close corporations. In its recent decision in
Rowland P. Rowland,"5 for instance, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
the majority shareholders' removal of the minority shareholders' veto
power did not warrant dissolution when there was no evidence that the
majority acted intentionally to oppress the minority.56
II. INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION STATUTES
A. Statutory Dissolution on Grounds Other Than Oppression or
Spec4'lc Acts of Minority Mistreatment
The dissolution statutes in seventeen states do not include mistreat-
ment or oppression of minority shareholders as grounds for involun-
tary dissolution.57 These statutes do grant dissolution on other grounds
however. Several state statutes provide minority relief through dissolu-
tion when corporate managers perform illegal or fraudulent acts. 8
Many of the oppressive acts of majorities, although technically legal,
are extremely prejudicial. Because the statutes that prohibit illegal or
fraudulent acts fail to cover such situations, they afford insufficient pro-
tection to oppressed minorities.
Another group of statutes in this category provides protection for
shareholders as a whole without affording relief specifically for a ma-
jority's prejudicial acts against a minority. 9 Applying this kind of stat-
55. 102 Idaho 534, 633 P.2d 599 (1981).
56. Id at 541, 633 P.2d at 606.
57. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-097 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-382 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.274 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1317 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-
128 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-7-3 (Bums 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.475 (Baldwin
1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981-82); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13A, § 1115(1) (West 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch 156, § 99 (Michie/Law Co-op 1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 78.650 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.97 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125
(1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.195 (West
1953); TEx. Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.771(1)(a) (West
1957).
58. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1317(a)(1)(B) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.475(l)(a)(2)
(Baldwin 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1115(1)(D) (West 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.771(1)(a) 2 (west 1957). These statutes also allow dissolution upon a minority suit for cor-
porate deadlock. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
59. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143(A)(3) (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981-82) ("when...
beneficial to the interests of the shareholders that the corporation should be ... dissolved"); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.97 (1977) ("whenever ... cause renders ... liquidation reasonably nec-
essary for the protection of the rights of stockholders"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.9 1(A)(3)
(Page 1978) ("when . . . beneficial to the shareholders that the corporation be judicially dis-
solved"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 18, § 1.195(3) (West 1953) ("when... beneficial to the interest of
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ute, the court in Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc. 60 refused to
expand its jurisdiction to protect oppressed minority shareholders from
corporate decisionmakers.61 The minority shareholders in Gruenberg
sought dissolution when the controlling shareholders continued to op-
erate the corporate sugar-cane plantation at a low return to minority
shareholders and refused to accept an offer to sell at a substantial
profit. Although the corporation's income was slight, the court denied
relief, finding that dissolution was not "beneficial to the interests of the
shareholders ' 62 because corporate assets had appreciated. 3
Deadlock ' is the most common ground for involuntary dissolution
in statutes not providing a dissolution remedy for minority, mistreat-
ment or oppression. I As typified by King v. Coulter,66 courts narrowly
interpret the statutory ground of deadlock, rejecting attempts to extend
the shareholders that the corporation should be. . .dissolved"). See generaly Hetherington &
.Dooley, supra note 1, at 17 n.45. For similar statutory language under which the minority share-
holder may seek protection, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (Deering 1977) ("when. . . rea-
sonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the complaining shareholder");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1975) ("when. . .reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights or interests of the complaining shareholder"),
60. 360 So. 2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
61. The Gruenberg court stated:
We appreciate the frustrations of the minority who are locked into a financial situation
in which they have a substantial interest but no control.. . .Our substantive law pro-
vides for involuntary dissolution but offers no remedy for the minority shareholder with
substantial holdings who is out of control and trapped in a closed corporation. We will
not abrogate the legislative function to provide relief.
Id at 887.
62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143A(3) (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981-82).
63. The court found that dissolution was not more beneficial to the shareholders because the
appreciation of corporate assets offset the corporation's past low returns. In addition, the court
determined that completion of a nearby bridge would increase the value of the corporate property
even more. 360 So. 2d at 886.
64. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-097 (A)(l)(a), (b) (1977) provides- a typical reading of a
deadlock statute. The Arizona statute grants courts
full power to liquidate ... a corporation...
I .... when it is established that either:
(a) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock ....
(b) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a period
which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to direc-
tors whose terms have expired ....
Id See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 97, infra note 70.
65. See supra note 64. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-382(a)(2)(i), (ii) (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.274(l)(a)(1), (2) (West 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-128(a)(1), (2) (1976); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-7-3(a)(5) (Bums 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143(4), (5) (West 1969 &
Cum. Supp. 1981-82); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 99(A)(b)(1), (2) (Michie/Law Co-op 1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91(A)(4) (Page 1978); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.195(4) (West
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/6
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its scope to include protection against unfairness to or oppression of
minorities.67 The plaintiff in King sought dissolution, asserting that
majority shareholders removed him as president, more than doubled
their salaries, employed family members, and loaned $80,000 of corpo-
rate money to their own company. The Arizona Supreme Court denied
dissolution, finding that the plaintiff's assertions fell outside the dead-
lock statute.68
1953); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.04(A)(1)(b), (e) (Vernon 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982, at art.
12.52(A)(6)).
Nevada and New Hampshire do not provide a remedy for corporate deadlock. See NEv. REV.
STAT. § 78.650 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.97 (1977).
Deadlock is a common ground for dissolution in states that provide relief specifically for minor-
ity shareholders as well as in those that do not. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195(a)(1) (a), (c) (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(1), (3) (1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-908(A)(1), (3) (1980); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1800(b)(2), (3) (Deering 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-8-113(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-97(a)(1), (3) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(1), (2) (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1981-82); IOwA CODE ANN. § 496A.94(l)(a), (b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82); MD.
CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-413(a)(1), (2) (1975); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(b)(1), (3)
(West Supp. 1981); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-193(a)(1), (3) (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.485
l(l)(a) (1969); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 35-2-711(a)(i), (iii) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2096(l)(a) (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-7(1)(a), (b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-16-16(A)(l)(a), (c) (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104(a)(1), (2) (McKinney 1963);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1), (2) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16(1)(a), (c) (1976); OR.
RE'. STAT. § 57.595(l)(a)(A), (C) (1979); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2107(A)(4) (Purdon 1967); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90(a)(1), (3) (1969); S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a)(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1981); S.D.
CostP. LAWS ANN. § 47-7-34(1), (3) (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008(1)(a)(i), (ii) (1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92(a)(1), (3) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2067(a)(1)(A), (C)
(1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-94(a)(1), (3) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.28.170(1)(a), (c)
(1969); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41(a)(1), (3) (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 17-36.86(a)(1), (3) (1965).
66. 113 Ariz. 245, 550 P.2d 623 (1976).
67. See also Alkire v. Interstate Theatres Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Mass. 1974) (federal
district court narrowly interpreted statute as granting power to dissolve for deadlock to only the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).
68. 113 Ariz. at 247, 550 P.2d at 625. The court examined three Arizona statutes before
reaching its decision. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-381 (repealed 1975) (current version at § 10-
094 (1977)), allowed corporate dissolution in actions of the attorney general for certain acts of the
corporation that affected the state. The court reviewed the revision of that statute, ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-094 (1977), which was to come into effect a few weeks after trial, finding the new
version substantially the same as its predecessor. The plaintiff's claim clearly fell outside the
terms of both statutes. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-097 (1977), also not effective at the time of
trial, allows dissolution in a suit by a minority shareholder whenever the plaintiff could show
deadlock. 113 Ariz. at 247, 550 P.2d at 625.
The court also noted that the factual circumstances were not sufficiently extraordinary to war-
rant equitable dissolution. Id
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B. Statutory Dissolution for Oppression of Minority Shareholders
The Illinois legislature adopted "oppression" as a ground for grant-
ing involuntary dissolution to a minority shareholder in 1933.69 The
Illinois legislation served as forerunner to the current Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA). The MBCA grants jurisdiction to the judi-
ciary to liquidate corporate asssets70 when the majority's actions are
"illegal, oppressive or fraudulent."'7 1 Responding to the needs of mis-
treated minority shareholders, twenty-six states have adopted provi-
sions identical or similar to those of the Model Act." The broad nature
69. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1954) (amended 1971). See gen-
erally Comment, supra note 26 at 805-07. The court in Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976), noted a consensus among Illinois courts that "'oppression' is, in and of itself,
an independent ground for relief not requiring a showing of fraud, illegality, mismanagement,
wasting of assets, nor deadlock, though these factors are frequently present." Id at 358.
70. Section 97 of the MCBA provides in part:
The courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a
corp6ration:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the
corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors
to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the election of their
successors; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 97 (1980 version).
71. Id § 97(a)(2).
72. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195(a)(1)(b) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(2) (1968); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-908(A)(2) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-8-I 13(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1-97(a)(2) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1981-82); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A. 94(1)(c) (West. Cum. Supp. 1981-82); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. § 3-413(b)(2) (1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-193(a)(2) (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.485 l(l)(b) (1969); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 35-2-71 l(a)(ii) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2096()(b) (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16(A)(l)(b) (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1104(a)(l), (2), 1104-a(a)(1) (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1981-82); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 10-
21-16(l)(b) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.595(1)(a)(B) (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 A(2)
(Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90(a)(2) (1969); S.D. CoMp. LAWS. ANN. § 47-7-34(2)
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008(1)(a)(iii) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92(a)(2) (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2067(a)(1)(B) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-94(a)(2) (1978); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 23A. 28.170(l)(b) (1969); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41(a)(2) (1975); Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-36.86(a)(2) (1965).
Although the following statutes are substantially the same as § 97(a) of the Model Act, they
have notable variations. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195(a)(l) (1975) (corporate insolvency is additional
ground for dissolution); MD. CoP,. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-602(a) (1975) (internal dissension
preventing operation of the corporation for shareholder advantage is additional ground for disso-
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of the term "oppressive" potentially includes a wide range of majority
actions.73 To obtain dissolution based on statutory grounds, minority
shareholders frequently assert that controlling shareholders have acted
oppressively. 74
lution); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.485 l(l)(6) (1969) (shareholder deadlock not ground for dissolu-
tion); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 35-2-71 l(a) (1981) (failure to carry out corporate purposes is
additional ground for dissolution); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104(a)(1), (2) (McKinney 1963 &
Cum. Supp. 1981-82, at § I 104-a(a), (b)) (no dissolution unless only feasible way for petitioner to
obtain fair return on investment and reasonably necessary to protect minority shareholder rights
and interests); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2107(A) (Purdon 1967) (failure or abandonment of corpo-
rate purpose is additional ground for dissolution; shareholder deadlock not grounds for dissolu-
tion; and dissolution must be beneficial to shareholders if basis for relief is illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent acts or misapplication or waste of corporate assets); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008(l)(a)
(1979) (internal dissension additional ground for dissolution when beneficial to shareholders; dis-
solution granted when corporation has ceased doing business and majority is withholding from
the minority their rightful share of corporate assets; dissolution based on any ground available
only if no other satisfactory relief).
73. One student author noted that although the common-law grounds for involuntary disso-
lution, such as gross mismanagement or director misconduct or abuse, see supra note 39, are not
specifically included in the Model Act, the term "oppressive" may serve to encompass those com-
mon-law grounds. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Groundfor Corporate Dissolution, supra
note 5, at 130. The Montana Supreme Court, however, observed that all jurisdictions provide
only limited definitions for the term "oppressive." Skierka v. Skierka Bros., - Mont. _ _., 629
P.2d 214. 221 (quoting MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 97 at 554).
74. See, e.g., Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 633 P.2d 599 (1981) (plaintiff claimed
defendant acted oppressively when defendant made board decisions without formal meetings and
voted to remove plaintiff's veto power); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 405
N.E.2d 839 (1980) (defendants allegedly acted oppressively when they conspired against plaintiff,
wrongfully accused him of theft, and barred him from the corporate business); Ross v. 311 N.
Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. App. 2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406 (1970) (plaintiff claimed defendant
acted oppressively when defendant authorized loan for defendant's own corporation without
plaintiff's knowledge, asserting that money was for a second mortgage that defendant never pro-
duced); Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962) (plaintiff
sought dissolution on grounds of oppression when defendant drew money from financially trou-
bled corporation, caused corporation to borrow money from assets as security, and left defend-
ant's family as beneficiaries in event of foreclosure on mortgage); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiffs claimed that defendants acted oppressively when de-
fendants arranged employment contracts to control management for 20 years, sold corporate as-
sets, and increased own salaries despite heavy corporate losses); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979) (when defendants discharged
plaintiff from employment plaintiff sought dissolution on grounds of oppression), a'd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup.
Ct., Special Term 1980) (plaintiff sought dissolution for oppression when defendants fired plain-
tiff, terminated his salary, and changed locks on corporate office to prevent plaintiff from partici-
pating in management); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387
(1973) (defendant allegedly acted oppressively when he prevented plaintiff from examining corpo-
rate records and failed to notify plaintiff of corporate meetings, falsifying records to show other-
wise); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972) (plaintiff claimed
oppression when defendant caused plaintiff to sustain tax losses under subchapter S by refusing to
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Courts face the problem of deciding what acts are oppressive and on
what basis to determine the existence of oppressive acts. Courts typi-
cally adopt one of two methods for determining oppression. A court
applying the first method will initially define or characterize the gen-
eral qualities of oppression that trigger dissolution,75 then, proceeding
on a case by case basis,76 determine whether a particular set of facts
falls within the terms of the enunciated definition.77 Variations on this
pay plaintiff dividends, removed plaintiff as corporate officer, and ordered new equipment for
defendant's own business without plaintiff's knowledge or consent); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262
S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (plaintiff sought dissolution for oppression when defendants removed
plaintiff from board, discontinued his salary, and caused the corporation to borrow $700,000,
without plaintiff's approval).
75. For examples of cases that set forth at least one definition for oppression, see Notzke v.
Art Gallery, Inc., 84 IlL App. 3d 294, 298-99, 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (may be continuous
course of conduct, and is not synonymous with "illegal" or "fraudulent"); Compton v. Paul K.
Harding Realty Co., 6 IM. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (1972) (same); Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 212, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1960) (same); Jackson v. St. Regis
Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("suggests harsh, dishonest, or wrong-
ful conduct and a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing which inure to the benefit of
majority and to the detriment of the minority"); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976) (" 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and fair dealing' ";
the cumulative effect of many such wrongful acts may constitute oppression); Skierka v. Skierka
Bros., - Mont. _ _, 629 P.2d 214, 221 (1981) ("'not requiring a showing of fraud, illegality,
mismanagement, wasting of assets, nor deadlock ... [but] suggests a visible departure from the
standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play' "); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
167 N.J. Super. 141, 151-52, 400 A.2d 554, 559-60 (Law Div. 1979) ("'can contemplate a continu-
ous course of conduct' "; "'visible departure from the standards of fair play. . . . [and] a lack of
probity and fair dealing' "), aft'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of
Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34,433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980) (" 'burdensome,
harsh, and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and fair dealing' "); Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628-29, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973) (same; closely related to "the
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing" owed to the minority, but single or continuous
breaches of that duty do not always warrant dissolution unless loss to minority is disproportion-
ate); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1972) (can
contemplte a continuing course of conduct, is not synonomous with "illegal" or "fraudulent", and
is a "visible departure from fair dealing and a violation of fair play' ").
76. For example, the court in Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976),
stated that oppression should be decided "on a case-by-case basis." Id at 358.
77. See, e.g., Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(defendant's refusal to amend rental or service charge structure held not oppressive); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., - Mont. - 629 P.2d 214 (1981) (defendant acted oppressively by evaluating
shares of plaintiff's deceased husband at less than defendant's, giving defendant corporate con-
trol); Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975) (court found that failure to
hold shareholder and director meetings, refusal to follow accepted corporate procedure, and mak-
ing of interest free loans to self when the corporation borrowed with interest constituted oppres-
sion); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972) (defendant acted
oppressively by refusing to pay dividends to plaintiff at great loss to plaintiff, removing plaintiff as
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procedure occur when a court determines the existence of oppressive
conduct without first supplying a general definition,78 or when a court
finds the behavior in question within the stipulated meaning of oppres-
sion but requires an accumulation of oppressive acts before granting
dissolution.79 Pursuant to the second method, a court will award disso-
lution on the basis of oppression when the actions of controlling share-
holders thwart the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders. 80
L The Case by Case Method
Courts have long struggled with defining the scope of oppression,8
relying almost exclusively on a definition borrowed from English
cases., 2 The English courts suggest that oppressive behavior 3 is "bur-
densome, harsh and wrongful," visibly departing from "standards of
fair dealing" to the prejudice of the minority.84 The Montana Supreme
Court, in Skierka v. Skierka Brothers, 5 quoted the English definition86
and reached its conclusion solely by comparing the facts of the case
before it to the terms of the definition. 7 The Skierka court found that
officer, and increasing number of board members to include defendant's wife, son, and attorney).
See infra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Pachman, supra note 5, at 326-30; Comment, supra note 73, at 130-41.
82. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 151-52, 400 A.2d 554, 559-60 (Law Div. 1979),
aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264
Or. 614, 628-29, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129,
134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1972); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980). See
also Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
83. Oppression is also a statutory ground warranting involuntary dissolution under The
[British] Company Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 210.
84. Scottish Co-op v. Meyer [1958] 3 All. E.R. 66, 71 [H.L.]; Edler v. Edler [19521 Sess. Cas.
49, 55. The Edler court stated that oppression "involve[s] a viable departure from the standards of
fair dealing, and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts
his money to a company is entitled to rely." Id. The court in Scottish Co-op later observed that
oppression "suggests... a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the
prejudice of some portion of its members." Scottish Co-op v. Meyer [1958] 3 All. E.R. 66, 86
[H.L.].
85. - Mont. _, 629 P.2d 214 (Mont. 1981).
86. Id at , 629 P.2d at 221. The Skierka court quoted the English definition as set forth in
the Missouri case of Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
87. The Skierka court noted that it broadly construed oppression statutes for close corpora-
tions. Some controversy exists over whether dissolution statutes should be narrowly or broadly
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although the defendant may have dealt fairly with the plaintiff, the ef-
fect of his actions was prejudicial. Focusing on the prejudicial effect,
the court determined that the defendant acted oppressively when he
excluded the plaintiff-widow of his deceased partner from all participa-
tion in corporate management and, when incorporating the former
partnership, he fixed plaintiff's stock valuation at less than his own to
assure himself a majority interest. 88
Occasionally, a court will decide whether majority conduct is suffi-
ciently oppressive without applying a specific standard or definition for
oppression.89 In Baylor v. Beverly Book Co. ,o for example, the plaintiff
asserted that the controlling shareholder failed to hold shareholder and
director meetings, operated the corporation for his own benefit, and
loaned corporate funds to himself without interest when the corpora-
tion was paying interest to its lenders. The Virginia Supreme Court
remanded the case for a hearing on the merits,91 holding that if the
lower court found the plaintiff's assertions true, then dissolution was
warranted on the ground of oppression.92 The state supreme court,
however, failed to provide the trial court with guidelines on which to
bring the facts within the statutory ground.
Moreover, some courts that use the case by case method find the ma-
jority's acts oppressive but nevertheless hold that there is an insufficient
basis for dissolving the corporation under an "oppression" statute. 93
Although the Illinois Supreme Court found no oppression in Central
StandardLffe Insurance Co. v. Davis,9 4 the court paved the way for the
adoption of a stricter standard for acquiring dissolution even where op-
construed. Compare Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 IlI. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1962) with Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 24, 216 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1975). See infra
notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
88. - Mont. at ._, 629 P.2d at 220-22. The court remanded the case to the trial court to
consider dissolution in light of other circumstances in the case.
89. See, e.g., Lynch v. Buchanan, 37 Md. App. 413, 377 A.2d 592 (1977); O'Farrell v. Steel
City Piping Co., 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 219, 403 A.2d 1319 (1978).
90. 216 Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975).
91. Id at 24, 216 S.E.2d at 20. Baylor was before the Virginia Supreme Court on the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff was precluded from bringing dissolution proceedings because the
defendant was willing to buy plaintiff's interest as provided in the corporate bylaws. The court
held that he was not. .d.
92. Id at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 19.
93. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Fix v. Fix Mate-
rial Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or.
614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
94. 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).
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pressive conduct is evident. The Central StandardLife court stated that
the term "oppressive," as provided in the dissolution statute, does not
necessarily infer "imminent disaster." Rather, it may "contemplate a
continuing course of conduct."95 In subsequent decisions, the Illinois
Supreme Court has relied heavily on its Central Standard Life charac-
terization of oppression,96 arguing that involuntary dissolution for op-
pression is justified only after the accumulation of oppressive acts over
a period of time.97
In Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co. ," for example, the corporate
president, holder of a fifty percent interest in the corporation, remained
in control of corporate management because the shareholders were un-
able to break the ten-year deadlock and elect new directors.99 During
those ten years the defendant-president held no annual stockholder
meetings and ran the company virtually as sole proprietor, refusing to
consult other directors. The court ignored the clear deadlock situation
as a ground for dissolution,1" basing its decision instead on the ground
of oppression. The court held that the defendant's continuing control
95. Id at 573, 141 N.E.2d at 50. For examples of other cases that adopted this language, see
Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc. 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 298, 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980); Compton v. Paul
K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (1972); Ross v. 311 N. Cent.
Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. App. 2d 336, 348, 264 N.E.2d 406, 413 (1970); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corru-
gated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 214, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1960); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty
Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 151, 400 A.2d 554, 559 (Law Div. 1979), aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App.
Div. 1980); White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1972). See
also Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 254 Or. 614, 630, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973).
96. The Central Standard Lpfe court also noted that majority actions need not be fraudulent
or illegal to be oppressive. 10 Ill. 2d at 573-74, 141 N.E.2d at 50. See also Notzke v. Art Gallery,
Inc., 84 11. App. 3d 294,299,405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co.,
6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E. 574, 581 (1972); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d
208, 215, 170 N.E. 2d 131, 138 (1960); Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 183
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Fix v. Fix Materials Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); In re
Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980);
White and P & W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980);
Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972); Polikoff v.
Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
98. 20 Ill. 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). See generally 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 525, 530-34 (1961); 74
HARV. L. REv. 1461, 1461 (1961).
99. The two families in the close corporation each held 50% interest. The vote on every
resolution was split.
100. For a discussion of deadlock as a ground for dissolution, see supra notes 64-68 and ac-
companying text.
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was oppressive'' because it deprived the other shareholders of their
rights and privileges as fifty percent owners of the corporation. Find-
ing no indication that the defendant's oppressive behavior would sub-
side, the court ordered dissolution. 2
Other jurisdictions have adopted Illinois' accumulation of oppressive
acts standard, requiring more than a single showing of oppression to
warrant dissolution."0  In Fix v. Fix Material Co., °4 the Missouri
Court of Appeals reached a harsh result in its application of the stan-
dard. The Fix court held that the combination of twenty-year employ-
ment contracts and salary increases to the majority shareholders, along
with heavy losses to the corporation and sale of corporate assets came
"narrowly close" to the level of oppression required for dissolution.
Although the behavior in question had occurred for nine years, the
court denied relief. The court warned, however, that continuation of
such conduct might lead to dissolution in a future action.'05
The Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged an exception to the ac-
cumulation of oppressive acts standard in Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc. 106 The court in Baker noted that a single oppressive act
101. The court stated that the defendant's behavior was "arbitrary and high-handed." 20 I11,
2d 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1960). In two other Illinois cases the court found controlling
shareholders' conduct oppressive, stating that it was "arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed."
Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 299, 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980); Compton v. Paul
K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 499, 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (1972).
102. 20 II. 2d 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1960). Two years later an Illinois court denied
dissolution in Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962),
finding the majority acts a "far cry" from the abuse and denial of rights in Gidwitz. Id at 37, 184
N.E.2d at 796. The Polikoff court held that the defendant's decisions to limit advertising, increase
salaries, and initiate a major rehabilitation project were exercises of business judgment and free
from court interference, regardless of the dubious financial state of the business. Id at 38, 184
N.E.2d at 796. See generally infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. The court refused to
grant dissolution even though the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by
causing it to borrow $60,000 from his wife, leaving her with a mortgage and the possibility of
acquiring all corporate assets through foreclosure. The court held defendant's behavior to be an
insufficient ground for granting dissolution. Id See generally Comment, supra note 7, at 482-85.
Furthermore, the court in Polikoffnoted that when investors purchase stock in a corporation they
implicitly agree to be bound by the acts of the majority of shareholders. Polikoff, 37 Ill. App. 2d
at 35-36, 184 N.E.2d at 795 (quoting Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 111. 197, 207, 32
N.E. 420, 4223 (1892)).
103. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973);
O'Farrell v. Steel City Piping Co., 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 219,403 A.2d 1319 (1978); White and P & W
Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
104. 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
105. Id at 361.
106. 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). See generally Comment, su~pra note 7, at 486-88.
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may be sufficient to warrant dissolution if the act is a serious breach of
trust. 10 7 The court found that the controlling shareholders' refusal to
allow minority shareholders to examine corporate records, in addition
to their failure to notify the minority shareholders of corporate meet-
ings, constituted oppressive behavior. The court denied dissolution,
however, holding that such behavior was not serious enough to fall
within the exception because it occurred for only one year with no indi-
cation that it would continue.0 8
2 The Reasonable Expectations Standard
Under the reasonable expectations standard of review, courts find
majority behavior oppressive if it is repugnant to the reasonable expec-
tations of the minority."° The expectations of shareholders vary
greatly between close and publicly held corporations."' The share-
holder in a publicly held corporation is usually a passive investor, in-
terested only in realizing a profit on his investment."I In contrast, the
close corporation shareholder frequently expects to participate in man-
agement 2 or to derive income from the business as a corporate officer
107. Id at 630, 507 P.2d at 394. See also 538 S.W.2d at 358 ("evidence of irreparable injury,
imminent danger of loss or miscarriage ofjustice" may be sufficient to trigger the exception). See
generally Pachman, supra note 5, at 327-28.
108. 264 Or. at 638, 507 P.2d at 397-98.
109. Professor O'Neal stated that Im]any close corporations are companies based on personal
relationships that give rise to expectations that the legislatures and court might well protect."
O'Neal, supra note 2, at 885-88. See generallv F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.15.
110. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 273-74 (Alaska 1980); Exadaktilos v. Cin-
naminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 153, 400 A.2d 554, 560-61 (Law Div. 1979), a7'd, 173
N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d
359, 365 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980). See generally Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 36.
111. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 153, 400 A.2d 554, 560
(Law Div. 1979), a'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980).
112. See Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 I11. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980) (plaintiff
expected to manage corporation's cocktail lounge); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill.
App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972) (plaintiff expected to participate in management of corpora-
tion's real estate business); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131
(1960) (holder of 50% of corporate stock expected to have say in corporate business); In re Hed-
berg-Friedheim & Co., 233 Minn. 435, 47 N.W.2d 424 (1951) (50% shareholder who had specific
duties regarding the corporate business expected to have some input regarding management of
business); Capital Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980) (plaintiff expected to man-
age retail car dealership); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d
554 (Law Div. 1979) (plaintiff expected to gain experience as restaurant employee and later to
participate in management of corportion's restaurant business), a 'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App.
Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct., Special
Term 1980) (plaintiff-pharmacist expected employment and active management position after
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or employee. 1 3 Unlike the shareholder in a publicly held corporation
who rarely knows the identity of fellow investors, the close corporation
shareholder generally expects to have immediate contact with fellow
shareholders through common ownership and management. As a re-
sult, maintaining a trusting and loyal relationship among owners is im-
portant to the shareholders of the close corporation."
14
In recent years, courts have recognized that corporate directors owe a
fiduciary duty not only to the corporation' 15 but to minority sharehold-
ers as well. 16 This duty grew out of the majority's inherent obligation
buying into new drug store business with defendants). But see Ross v. 311 N. Cent. Ave. Bldg.
Corp., 130 Ill. App. 2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406 (1970) (plaintiff did not anticipate an active role in
management); litre Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981) (parties contem-
plated that defendant would actively manage building and operation of nursing home); Fix v. Fix
Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff took deceased husband's interest in
corporation but did not actively participate in management of construction supply business). See
generally Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440-41 (W. Va. 1980); Comment, supra note 73,
at 141.
113. See, e.g., Stumpf v. C.S. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1975); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Il. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), agf'd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup.
Ct., Special Term 1980). See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975). See generally Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440-41 (W. Va. 1980); F. O'NEAL,
supra note 6, § 7.15, at 526.
Some investors actually depend on their interest in a close corporation as "their sole source of
employment and income as well as their major capital investment." Comment, Relie/to Oppressed
Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnershp Precepts andRelated Considerations, supra note 2, at
412. See Note, supra note 2, at 272.
114. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 2-3, 36; Leffler, supra note 9, at 255.
115. Corporate directors have always owed a fiduciary duty to the corporaton. H. HENN, LAW
OF CORPORATxONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970). See also Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 211
So. 2d 151, 156 (1968) (directors occupy "quasi fiduciary relation to the corporation"). Similarly,
the members of a partnership have a fiduciary duty to their other partners. Id § 22, at 54; R.
SUGARMAN, SUGARMAN ON PARTNERSHIPS §§ 92-99, at 121-29 (4th ed. 1966).
116. See, eg., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137
Minn. 65, 69, 162 N.W. 1056, 1958 (1917); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305,311, 564
P.2d 277, 281 (1977); Zidell v. Zidell, 277 Or. 413, 418, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1976); Masinter v.
Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980). Cf. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (majority shareholders not fiduciaries in strict sense but principles of fiduci-
ary law useful in determining whether majority conduct warrants minority relief). See generally
Carpenter & Vick, Recent Developments in Missouri- Corporate La-.4 Continuing Evolution, 48
U.M.K.C, L. Rav. 545, 584 (1980); Hornstein, supra note 2, at 278-79; Comment, supra note 73, at
132-33. The court in Masinter v. Webco Co. pointed out, however, that "[w]hile the existence of
the fiduciary duty rule is widely acknowledged, it does not mean that the officers and directors are
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to exercise good faith and fair dealing toward minority shareholders.11 7
As courts began to recognize this general duty, several commentators
asserted more specifically that the majority's frustration of a minority
shareholder's opportunity to achieve his reasonable expectations in a
close corporation constitutes a breach of trust. They argued that if this
breach of trust is severe, it will constitute oppression, thereby giving
rise to a cause of action for dissolution."18
Only recently have courts begun to follow the recommendation of
these commentators by adopting the reasonable expectations test" 9 for
determining oppression of minority shareholders. 120 For example, the
New York County Supreme Court, Special Term, used the reasonable
expectations test to dissolve a corporation in In re Application of Top-
per.'' The plaintiff in Topper left his job of twenty-five years and
not accorded a rather broad latitude in the conduct of corporate affairs." Masinter v. Webco Co.,
262 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1980) (footnotes omitted).
117. Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1980).
118. See, e.g., Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model
forReform, 55 VA. L. REv. 1043, 1063-66 (1969); O'Neal, supra note 2, at 885-88; Comment, supra
note 113, at 422; Comment, supra note 73, at 141.
119. Professor O'Neal states the underlying principle of the reasonable expectations test as
follows:
[I]n a corporation based on a personal relationship a court should give relief, dissolution
or some other remedy, to a minority shareholder whenever corporate managers or con-
trolling shareholders act in a way that disappoints the minority shareholder's reasonable
expectations, even though the acts of the managers or controlling shareholders fall
within the literal scope of powers or rights granted them by the corporation act or the
corporation's charter or bylaws.
F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.15, at 525.
Courts that apply the reasonable expectations test must examine the original understanding
between the parties to determine what each party expected-and knew the other to expect-from
its relationship with the corporation. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty, Co., 167 N.J. Super.
141, 155, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979), a'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re
Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980).
But see infra note 131 (court should examine whole history of relationship of parties). See gener-
ally' F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.15.
120. See, eg., Capital Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), a 'd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); Inre Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25,433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup.
Ct., Special Term 1980); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). See generally
Comment, supra note 7, at 480.
When controlling shareholders deny plaintiff his reasonable expectations with a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, courts find no breach of fiduciary duty. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty
Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law. Div. 1979) (no breach of fiduciary duty when major-
ity shareholders discharged plaintiff whose work was dissatisfactory), af'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559
(App. Div. 1980). For a discussion of Exadaktilos, see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
121. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980). The court in Masinter
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traveled from Florida to New York to enter into business with defend-
ants, investing his life savings in the new venture. The defendants were
fully aware that the plaintiff expected to continue as an active partici-
pant in the business. The court held that by discharging the plaintiff as
a corporate employee and officer, terminating his salary, and changing
office locks to prevent the plaintiff from participating in the manage-
ment, the majority shareholders had caused severe damage to the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations.' 22 Finding the effect oppressive, the
Topper court stated that it would not inquire whether the defendants
acted in good business judgment 123 or for cause.' 24
The New Jersey Superior Court, in Exadaklilos v. Cinnaminson Re-
aly Co. ,"'5 limited the scope of the reasonable expectations test by re-
fusing to award dissolution when the close corporation minority
shareholder's reasonable expectations were thwarted through his own
conduct. The court found that the plaintiff's understanding that he
would someday participate in managing the company restaurant was
defeated because he failed to learn the business. The court held that
plaintiff's discharge from employment constituted a legitimate business
purpose and was therefore not oppressive.'2 6
In Capital Toyota v. Ger win, 127 the Mississippi Supreme Court
adopted a stricter version of the reasonable expectations test. The court
v. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433, 441-43 (W. Va. 1980), discussed the reasonable expectations test in a
manner consistent with the application of the test in Topper. Because of insufficient facts, how-
ever, the Masinter court failed to decide the case on its merits.
122. 107 Misc. 2d at 26-27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
123. See generally infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
124. 107 Misc. 2d at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The Topper court found Professor O'Neal's
comments on the reasonable expectations test particularly helpful. In his treatise on minority
oppression, O'Neal posited a hypothetical situation almost identical to the Topper facts:
If a person gives up employment. . . to "go in business for himself' and. . . buys a
minority interest in a close corporation. . . in which [he] contemplate[s] that each one of
the shareholders will be an officer or key employee and share in the control. . . , obvi-
ously it is unjust to permit majority shareholders to oust the minority shareholder from
the directorate and cause the corporation to discharge him from employment, especially
if the corpbration is paying no dividends, as is usually the case.
F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.15, at 526.
125. 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), af'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div.
1980). Exadakllos was based on the class of statutes discussed in Part II(C) of this Note rather
than statutes in Part II(B) that use the language of MBCA. Like the MBCA, however, the New
Jersey statute in Exadakilos includes oppression as a ground for involuntary dissolution.
126. Id at 155-56, 400 A.2d at 561-62. The Exadaktils court noted that the business judg-
ment rule should not always apply because the rule too frequently allows majority shareholders to
abuse their authority at the expense of minority shareholders. Id at 154, 400 A.2d at 561.
127. 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980):
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required that before it could grant dissolution, minority expectations
must be "grossly" thwarted.' The court held that discharging the mi-
nority shareholder for inadequate performance as corporate general
manager did not justify dissolution on the ground of oppression, even
though the incorporation agreement specified that he would manage
the business.1
29
Courts generally do not require that the reasonable expectations be
in writing. Although the Mississippi court in Capital Toyota relied on
the shareholders' written agreement to establish the parties' reasonable
expectations, it did not mandate such evidence. 3 Similarly, the deci-
sions in Exadaktilos and Topper reveal a judicial willingness to deter-
mine the reasonable expectations of shareholders without evidence of a
written agreement between the parties.13' The Exadaktilos court in-
ferred shareholder expectations from their conduct.' 32 In Topper, the
court went one step further by stating specifically that a written agree-
ment was not necessary to prove reasonable expectations.133
C Statutory Dissolution for Specfic Acts of Mistreatment Toward
Minority Shareholders
The final category of state dissolution statutes is more expansive than
the current MBCA134 in protecting mistreated minority shareholders.
Three of the five statutes in this category retain oppression as a ground
for dissolving corporations, 3 and all five statutes provide additional,
more specific grounds'36 upon which dissolution may be ordered.1 37
128. Id at 1039. In arriving at its conclusion, the court in Capital Toyota relied heavily on the
decision in Exadakfilos.
129. The court stated that plaintiff's performance as a manager was "reasonably good, but not
outstanding." Id at 1939. See id n.l for further detail on plaintiff's management performance.
130. 381 So. 2d at 1038.
131. Professor O'Neal recommends that courts "put primary emphasis on expectations gener-
ated by the participants' original business bargain. . . . However,. . . a court should examine
the whole history of the participant's relationship as expectations alter and new expectations de-
velop over the course of the participants' cooperative efforts in operating the business." F.
O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.15, at 527.
132. 167 N.J. Super. at 155-56, 400 A.2d at 561-62.
133. 107 Misc. 2d at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
134. See supra note 70, at § 97(a)(2).
135. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(825)(1) (1974) ("wilfully unfair and oppressive"); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West. Cum. Supp. 1981-82) ("acted oppressively or unfairly"); S.C.
CODE § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1981-82) ("oppressive or unfairly prejudicial").
136. California provides for involuntary dissolution when:
(4) Those in control of the corporation have been guilty of or have knowingly counte-
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Most of these specific statutory grounds for involuntary dissolution are
common to two or more statutes.13 8  "Unfairness" toward minority
shareholders is the only ground for dissolution shared by all five stat-
utes. 139 No jurisdiction, however, has yet developed a standard for de-
termining what constitutes an unfair act. 140
The California, Minnesota, and Michigan dissolution statutes qual-
nanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or persis-
tent unfairness toward any shareholders ....
(5) In the case of any corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders ... liquidation is
reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the complaining
shareholder.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1800(b)(4), (5) (Deering 1977).
The Michigan statute allows dissolution when "the acts of . . . those in control of the
corporaton are illegal, fraudulent or wilfully unfair and oppressive to the . . . fcomplaining]
shareholder." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(825)(1) (1974).
Minnesota provides for involuntary dissolution when "[t]he directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner persistently unfair toward one or
more minority shareholders." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302 A.751(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981).
The New Jersey involuntary dissolution statute provides for liquidation when:
in the case of a corporation having 25 or less shareholders, the directors or those in
control have acted fraudulently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their
authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one of
more minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or
employees.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82).
South Carolina provides for involuntary dissolution when "It]he acts of the directors or those in
control of the corporation. . . are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or to
any shareholder whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation.
S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Curn. Supp. 1981).
137. California provides minority shareholder relief on broad as well as specific grounds,
granting dissolution when "reasonably necessary for the protection of rights and interests of the
complaining shareholder." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (Deering 1977). See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1975) (dissolution statute has broad provision for protection of minority
shareholders, but no provision for specific acts). But see supra note 59 and accompanying text
(dissolution statutes providing protection for shareholders as a whole, not just minority
shareholders).
138. Two statutes, however, provide grounds unique in their state. See CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1800(b)(5) (Deering 1977) ("reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of
the complaining shareholder"); S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1981) ("unfairly
prejudicial").
139. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (Deering 1977) ("persistent and pervasive. . . abuse
of authority or persistent unfairness"); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(825)(1) (1974) ("willfully un-
fair and oppressive"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981) ("in a manner per-
sistently unfair"); NJ. STAT. -ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82) ("abused
authority... or. . . acted oppressively or unfair"); S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a)(4)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1981-82) ("oppressive or unfairly prejudicial").
140. One New Jersey court noted that there was also no legislative indication of what consti-
tutes unfairness. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 150, 400 A.2d 554,
560 (Law Div. 1979), aJ'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980).
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ify their unfairness provisions. The Michigan statute, for example,
grants dissolution only when the conduct of majority shareholders is
,,wilfully unfair.' 141 Michigan courts, however, have not yet consid-
ered a dissolution suit based on a charge of willful unfairness. 42 Both
California and Minnesota permit corporate dissolution for "persistent
unfairness" by controlling shareholders.'43 In Buss v. Martin Co.,144 the
California District Court of Appeals defined "persistent" as denoting a
course of action that continues despite opposition.145  The Buss court
granted dissolution, holding that the majority stockholder acted with
persistent unfairness n6 by providing himself with an excessive salary,
by refusing plaintiffs access to corporate books, records, and property,
141. See supra note 136 for the language of MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(825)(1) (1974).
142. Although the plaintiff in Barnett v. International Tennis Corp., 80 Mich. App. 396, 263
N.W.2d 908 (1978), sought dissolution on the grounds of wilful unfairness and oppression, the
court denied dissolution without considering these grounds. Instead, the Barnett court stated that
the test was whether continuation of the same management would cause inevitable ruin. Id at
417, 263 N.W.2d at 918.
143. The New Jersey legislature recognized that "California and Minnesota add[ed] the con-
cept of abuse of authority and unfairness toward minority shareholders [to the MBCA]." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A-12-7, comment (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82).
144. 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1966).
145. Id at 134, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The Buss court relied on the dictionary definition of
persistent: "continuing in a course of action without regard to opposition or previous failure;
tenacious of position or purpose: inclined to persist ... existing for a long or longer than usual
time or continuously: ENDURING, LINGERING." Id at 134, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (quoting WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).
146. The court in Buss based its decision on CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651(e), (f) (1955) (current
version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4), (5) (Deering 1977), which provides for dissolution when
"[tihe directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of persistent fraud, misman-
agement, or abuse of authority, or persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders .. " Id
For the language of the current version of the same provisions, see supra note 136. The current
version retains the ground of "persistent unfairness" as a basis for granting involuntary dissolu-
tion. Since the effective date of the statutory revision, however, no California case has been de-
cided on that ground. See Stumpfv. C.S. Stumpf& Sons, 47 Cal. App. 3d 230,234, 120 Cal. Rptr.
671, 673 (1975) (court of appeals noted that lower court "specifically found that there had been no
.unfairness").
Similarly, no Minnesota court has dissolved a corporation on the "persistent unfairness"
ground, even though the provision has withstood an amendment. See generally MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 301.49(b)(3) (repealed 1981, effective Jan. 1, 1984) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.75(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981)). When the Minnesota Supreme Court recently dissolved a
corporation on the statutory ground of abuse of authority by the controlling shareholder, the court
stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether the defendant's behavior was also persistently
unfair. See In re Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati, 312 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1981). The new
Minnesota involuntary dissolution statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.75 (West Supp. 1981), no
longer includes "abuse of authority" as a ground for dissolution.
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and by causing the corporate business to deteriorate 147 to the detriment
of minority shareholders. 148
The South Carolina statute represents another variation on the un-
fairness ground, 149 granting courts the right to dissolve corporations on
a showing of "unfairly prejudicial" acts by majority shareholders. 5
South Carolina courts, deciding what acts fall within this provision ac-
cording to the facts of each case, have not yet developed a working
definition of the statutory language.' 5'
Two of the five states in this category, California and New Jersey,
allow involuntary dissolution on a showing of "abuse of authority" by
controlling shareholders.'52 Minnesota had included abuse of author-
ity as a ground for dissolution until the Minnesota Business Corpora-
tion Act of 1981 took effect.' 53 Although neither California nor New
Jersey have decided a dissolution suit on the basis of the majority's
abuse of authority, 54 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Villa Maria,
Inc. v. Mondai,1'" dissolved a corporation on that ground six months
147. The court in Buss found that the defendant lost steady customers and key employees by
his offensive behavior. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 135, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
148. Id Although Buss was decided on statutory grounds, the actions of the defendant in
running the corporation for his own benefit are similar to those which have given rise to a cause of
action in equity. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
149. For the language of the South Carolina statute, see supra note 136.
150. Id New Jersey specifies that a court should consider injury to the petitioner "whether
[sustained] in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation." S.C. CODE
§ 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Similarly, New Jersey considers mistreatment to "mi-
nority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-82). See generally Exadaktilos v. Cinnamin-
son Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 153, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law. Div. 1979), aft'd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c), comment (West Cum. Supp. 1981-
82).
151. See, e.g, Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977) (court provided no rationale
in holding that by withdrawing over one million dollars from the corporation for their own use,
the controlling shareholders not only misapplied corporate assets but also "have acted oppres-
sively and unfairly to the interests of the plaintiffs and to their prejudice"). Id at 37, 236 S.E.2d at
318.
152. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (Deering 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c)
(West Cum. Supp. 1981-82). For the language of the California and New Jersey statutes, see
supra note 136.
153. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.40(3) (repealed 1981, effective Jan. 1, 1984) (current version
at § 302A.751(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981)). See supra note 136 for Minnesota's new statutory
language.
154. The court in Exadaktilos decided the case on grounds of oppression but noted that
"freeze out maneuvers in close corporations constitute an abuse of corporate power." 167 N.J.
Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979), afd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980).
155. 312 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1981).
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before the new Minnesota Act abolished it.
The Villa Maria court found that the defendant had caused the cor-
poration to do business with another corporation owned solely by the
defendant without acquiring the consent of the other shareholder or
providing him with notice. Because the controlling shareholder ran the
corporate business for his own benefit, without regard for the other
shareholder's substantial financial interest in the company, the court
held that his conduct was "tantamount to an abuse of authority." '56
III. CONSIDERATION OF PRESENT OBSTACLES IN ACQUIRING
INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
Although all states presently have involuntary dissolution statutes,' 57
some of these statutes provide minority shareholders with insufficient
grounds for acquiring dissolution for mistreatment by controlling
shareholders.'15 While such minority shareholders potentially have a
remedy at law, the limited scope of the legislation offers them little
hope of bringing their claims within the statutory terms. 159
Most dissolution statutes, however, provide adequate grounds for ob-
taining relief.160 Furthermore, most minority shareholders may assert
an equitable remedy,' 6 ' notwithstanding the provisions of their particu-
lar state's legislation.' 62 Whether they seek relief in equity or at law,
however, judicial reluctance to dissolve corporations inevitably pre-
sents a great obstacle to minority shareholders. 63
Judicial reluctance is most formidable, however, when courts inter-
pret and apply involuntary dissolution statutes. Although some courts
liberally construe dissolution statutes, finding them remedial in na-
ture, 164 most dissolve corporations only if the alleged grounds fall
156. Id at 922.
157. See supra notes 57, 72 & 136 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
160. See supra notes 69-156 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
162. The Pennsylvania legislature noted that the state involuntary dissolution statute did not
limit the existing equity power of the courts. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 A(2), comment, at 623
(Purdon 1967).
163. See supra note 22.
164. See, e.g., Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 24, 216 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1975). Cf.
Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 41, 184 N.E.2d 792, 797 (1962) (Burman,
J., dissenting) (courts should broadly construe statute when misconduct involves the corporation's
sole asset); Skierka v. Skierka Bros., - Mont. _ _, 629 P.2d 214, 221 (1981) (interprets statutory
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within the narrow statutory terms. 165  Furthermore, while dissolution
statutes grant courts full power to dissolve a corporation in certain cir-
cumstances, they do not mandate the exercise of that power. 166 Thus,
many courts use their discretion to deny dissolution even where it is
permitted explicitly by statute. 67
There are four policy rationales that courts implicitly or explicitly
assert as justification for their reluctance to grant involuntary dissolu-
tion in minority shareholder suits.' 68  Each of these rationales falters
under close scrutiny. First, courts reason that it is not their role to ex-
tinguish legislatively created entities. 169 Every state legislature, how-
ever, through the enactment of involuntary dissolution statutes, 170 has
granted its courts full power to dissolve corporations. By strictly apply-
ing the dissolution statutes, courts have failed to effectuate the legisla-
tive intent that corporate entities be extinguished in certain instances.
Furthermore, courts have an inherent power in equity to provide fair
results within the spirit of the law. When courts refuse to dissolve a
ground of oppression broadly when applied to close corporations); White and P & W Oil Co. v.
Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972) (although court should broadly construe
statute, alternate remedies are available). See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See also
Henry George & Sons v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1981) (quoting 16A W.
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8034.1 (1979) (courts should construe and apply statutes
according to equitable principles).
165. See, eg., Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic, 401 So. 2d 410,414 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (Louisi-
ana dissolution statute provides specific and limited grounds for dissolution and that an alleged
breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient to warrant dissolution under the Louisiana statute); Turner
v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 269 Md. 407, 410, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973) (refused to extend terms of
statute that provided the dissolution remedy to holders of shares to income beneficiaries of testa-
mentary trust).
166. See supra note 23.
167. See, eg., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980). See also
supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
168. For examples of cases in which the court implicitly relied on a policy argument in deny-
ing dissolution, see Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962)
(majority rule); Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (busi-
ness judgment rule and preservation of legislatively created entity); In re Radom & Neideroff,
Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (avoidance of injury to public). See generaly infra text
accompanying notes 168-87. For examples of cases in which the court explicitly asserted a policy
rationale as justification for denying dissolution, see cases cited infra notes 169, 174, 179, 182 &
185-86.
169. See Alkire v. Interstate Theatres corp., 379 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D.C. Mass. 1974); Cal-
lier v. Callier, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1978); Feess v. Mechanics' State
Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 834-35, 115 P. 563, 565-66 (1911). See generaly Comment, Dissolution at Suit
ofa Ainorty Stockholder, 41 MICH. L. REv. 714, 714 (1943).
170. See supra notes 57, 72 & 136 and accompanying text. Put e. Sra note 21 (some legisla-
tion provides for involuntary dissolution only when other remedies are unavailable).
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corporation even to achieve fairness, they avoid their responsibilities,
and defeat the purposes of equity. Finally, judicial reluctance to dis-
turb legislatively created entities for minority mistreatment'71 or dead-
lock'7 2 seems misplaced when state officials readily terminate
corporations for failure to comply with simple legal formalities.'7 3
A second rationale that courts commonly assert in denying dissolu-
tion stems from the corporate doctrine of majority rule.'74 This doc-
trine provides that an investor impliedly consents to corporate policies
as determined by the majority.' 75 A shareholder's right is generally
proportionate to his interest in the corporation. By purchasing less
than a majority interest, a shareholder arguably waives his right to as-
sert a claim of dissatisfaction with majority management. Neverthe-
less, while a minority shareholder may consent to majority rule, he
does not thereby agree to become the subject of abuse. A minority
shareholder reasonably expects the person to whom he entrusts his
money to treat him fairly,'76 whether out of an inherent sense of obliga-
tion or because of a legally imposed fiduciary duty. 17 7 Because the
principle of majority rule assumes that minority shareholders implicitly
surrender control of their investments to the majority, the rule conflicts
with the realities of close corporations, in which most shareholders ex-
pect to participate in corporate management.'7 1
A third explanation that courts offer for their reluctance to dissolve
171. See, e.g., Capital Toyota v. Gerwin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980) (court denied dissolu-
tion even though defendant discharged plaintiff in violation of incorporation agreement); Fix v.
Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (court denied dissolution but warned that if
defendant's oppressive conduct continued plaintiff might obtain relief in future); Baker v. Com-
mercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973) (although court found that defend-
ant acted oppressively it denied dissolution because no indication that conduct would continue).
172. See, e.g., In re Radom & Neideroff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
173. See supra note 10. See also Stumpf v. C.S. Stumpf & Sons, 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235, 120
Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1975); Hornstein, supra note 8, at 245.
174. See, ag., Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 35-36, 184 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1962); Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. App. 2d 245, 250, 134 N.E.2d 653, 656
(1956), aj7d, 10 I11. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).
175. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 215, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135. See
generally O'Neal, supra note 2, at 884; Note, Minority Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1068, 1068 (1967); Note, Standards of Management Conduct in Close Corpo-
rations: A TransactionalApproach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1141, 1146 (1981); Comment, supra note 7,
at 492-93.
176. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 6,
§ 9.04, at 582-83.
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corporations is that management decisions are traditionally protected
by the business judgment rule, which affords corporate management
wide discretion in decisionmaking. 179 Embodying the presumption
that controlling shareholders act in the best interest of the corpora-
tion,"8 the business judgment rule' 8' protects management from har-
rassment by discontented shareholders and from undue interference by
the judiciary.'82 By deferring to the judgment of controlling sharehold-
ers, however, courts often fail to restrain abuse of power by the major-
ity. 183 Moreover, although courts may not be qualified to consider the
propriety of the complex business decisions of publicly held corporate
directors, decisions facing close corporation directors are usually well
within the scope of judicial understanding. 18 4
A final rationale offered by courts for their unwillingness to grant
179. See, e.g., Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 111. App. 2d 29, 35-36, 184 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1962) See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 3.03, at 59.
180. The court in Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. Sup. 1981) stated that "the business judgment rule pro-
tects the directors from liability by a presumption that the decision is proper." Id at 1255.
181. See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979);
Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?,
37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981); Brown & Phillips, The Business Judgment Rule" Burks v. Lasker and
Other Recent Developments, 6 J. CORP. LAW 453 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment Rule In
Derivative SuitsAgainst Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980); Note, The Continuing Viabiliy
of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guidefor Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967);
Note, Standards of Management Conduct in Close Corporations: .4 Transactional Approach, 33
STAN. L. REV. 1141 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors,
6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 263 (1981); Comment, supra note 7; Comment, The Business Judgment Rule:
A1 Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 151 (1962); 38 LA. L. REV. 214
(1977); 25 VILL. L. REv. 551 (1979-80).
182. Johnston v. Livingstone Nursing Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d 151, 155 (Ala. 1968); Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980); Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp.,
37 IlL. App. 2d 29, 38, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962); Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 277 Minn.
432, 445, 152 N.W.2d 758, 767 (1967); Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 182
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Home v. Radiological Health Services, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 446, 451, 371
N.Y.S.2d 948, 957 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), af'dmem., 51 App. Div. 2d 544,379 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1976).
But see, e.g., Gray v. Hall, 10 IU. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1973) (questions
continued validity of business judgment rule in Illinois in certain instances); Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) (court willing to substitute its judgment for
judgment of corporate managers); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141,
154, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979) (majority freeze-out maneuvers cannot be immune from
scrutiny under the business judgment rule), at'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1980); In re
Application of Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1980)
(court disregarded whether discharge of plaintiff from employment was good business judgment).
183. See supra note 126.
184. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 9.04, at 584. See generally id, § 9.04.
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dissolution is that the remedy may have adverse effects on the commu-
nity, eliminating corporate jobs and depriving consumers of essential
goods and services.' 85 A dissolution order, however, does not necessar-
ily result in liquidation of the corporate business. A shareholder or
third party may purchase the entire business, leaving little or no inter-
ruption in business operations.' 86 Furthermore, public policy demands
minority shareholder protection to encourage the growth of new busi-
ness.187 Prospective investors may choose not to invest in a close cor-
poration that might have provided the community with new jobs,
goods, and services rather than risk becoming locked in without re-
course against possible majority mistreatment.
Thus, none of the judicial rationales for reluctance to involuntarily
dissolve corporations withstands close analysis. Similarly, the stan-
dards that courts presently employ in determining whether to grant dis-
solution are often inadequate or misapplied. For instance, in applying
the case by case method,1 88 courts tend to curtail the effectiveness of the
185. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 152 (N.D. Ala. 1968);
Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Or. 560, 586, 348 P.2d 9, 22 (1959); Henry George & Sons v.
Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 515 (Wash. 1981).
Courts are especially reluctant to dissolve profitable corporations. See Johnston v. Livingston
Nursing Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d 151, 155 (Ala. 1968); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257
A.2d 398, 406 (Del. Ch. 1969); Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 277 Minn. 432,445, 152 N.W.2d
758, 767 (1967). But see Kruger v. Gerth, 22 A.D.2d 916, 917,255 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (1964) (court
denied dissolution in equity because no showing of bad faith even though corporation operated
without a profit), af'dmez, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1965).
Two commentators observed that courts perceive public interest as dictating their reluctance to
dissolve solvent or profitable corporations. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 27. Profes-
sors Hetherington and Dooley, however, suggest that this reasoning is faulty because the practical
effect of a dissolution order does not usually result in the termination of an ongoing business. To
the contrary, one of the parties to the suit usually buys out the other and continues business after
dissolution of the corporate entity. See id at 28, 32-33, 65-75 app.
The Rhode Island legislature guarded against judicial reluctance to involuntarily dissolve a
profitable corporation by specifying that courts could dissolve a corporation in a minority share-
holder's action "whether or not the corporate business has been or could be operated at a profit."
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-90(a)(2) (1969).
186. See supra note 18.
187. Professor Hornstein encouraged dissolution for the public benefit in some instances. He
stated:
Not only private rights and elemental principles of contract, but also the economic
health of the country and consequently the public interest call for the winding-up of a
corporation when it is just and equitable. It may be anticipated that, with the separation
of corporate ownership from control, the need for this remedy will become greater, both
as a matter of immediate justice and as a deterrent to others.
Hornstein, supra note 8, at 249.
188. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
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well-established ground of oppression, which potentially allows disso-
lution for a wide range of majority acts.1i 9 A case by case analysis of
oppression leads to vague and inconsistent results, providing the mi-
nority shareholder with few guidelines on which to base a claim.'90
Courts that expand this test by requiring an accumulation of oppressive
acts allow minority mistreatment to continue too long before allowing
relief. 191
The reasonable expectations test, 192 on the other hand, is a more
promising test for minority shareholders seeking dissolution for mis-
treatment. Courts adopting this test recognize that close corporations,
unlike public-issue corporations, are frequently based on personal rela-
tionships in which individual expectations reasonably extend beyond
mere profit-making. 193 Moreover, application of the reasonable expec-
tations test is consistent with the current trends toward acknowledge-
ment of the existence of a fiduciary duty between majority and
minority shareholders' 94 and the need for special treatment of close
corporations. 195 Courts that narrowly apply the test, however, diminish
its effectiveness.196
IV. CONCLUSION
The few statutes that expand present MBCA provisions to provide
more specific guidelines for the courts197 potentially afford the greatest
protection for mistreated minority shareholders. By listing specific ma-
jority shareholder acts warranting dissolution, legislators grant courts
unquestionable authority to dissolve corporations in a variety of partic-
ular instances, thus encouraging judicial activity.'93 Broad statutory
189. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 2 & 6-8 and accom-
panying text.
194. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
195. See sufora note 2.
196. See, e.g., case discussed supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 134-56 and accompanying text. See generally Hornstein, supra note 8, at
250-51; Comment, supra note 73, at 141. Professor Hornstein warns, however, against too much
specificity in stating the available grounds for acquiring dissolution for it encourages defendants
to "get around the law" by asserting that their actions have been outside the statutory terms.
Hornstein, supra note 8, at 250.




grounds, in contrast, only enhance judicial reluctance by providing
courts with too much discretion in ordering dissolution.199
Judicial reluctance to dissolve corporations, however, continues to
limit the effectiveness of even the most liberal dissolution legislation.20°
Equity has similarly failed to establish a basis on which courts will
freely grant dissolution.20 1 Leaving courts with wide discretion simply
has not worked. Minority shareholders of close corporations cannot
hope to receive adequate protection against the oppressive majority un-
til all states pass legislation providing courts with specific guidelines
under which to proceed. More importantly, for such legislation to be
effective, it must be mandatory rather than permissive in nature, re-
quiring that courts impose the dissolution remedy when appropriate.
Linda L. Shapiro
Task Force referred to the new involuntary dissolution statute and stated: "Fraudulent or illegal
acts continue to be a ground, but dissolution should be granted more frequently to minor share-
holders who have been treated inequitably by management." ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON MINN.
CORP. LAW, REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SENATE (1981), reprinted in Preface to MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 1981), at XXV-XXVI.
The Commissioner's comments following the 1972 amendments to New Jersey's involuntary
dissolution statute state that "in the context of a closely-held corporation [New Jersey] courts
should be free to look beyond direct harm to the value of a shareholder's investment and to
consider all pertinent factors." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c), comment (West Cum. Supp.
1981-82).
199. See supra notes 59-133 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., case cited supra note 142.
201. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
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